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MANNED OPERATIONS FOR THE APOLLO LUNAR MODULE 
I N  A SIMULATED SPACE ENVIRONMENT 
By 0. L. Pearson and P. R. Gauth ie r *  
Manned Spacecraft Center 
SUMMARY 
To simulate the flight conditions during ground thermal-vacuum testing of the 
Apollo lunar module, the crewmen were required to enter and leave the lunar module 
while the vehicle was in vacuum conditions. These ingress/egress sequences r e p r e  - 
sented the f i r s t  time that men in space suits transferred from one set of umbilicals to 
another s e t  while in vacuum conditions. The ease with which these critical t ransfers  
were made was achieved only through rigorous equipment qualification, extensive 
training exercises,  and detailed test procedures. The planning, preparation, review, 
and specialized techniques which were required to meet the objectives of this tes t  pro-  
gram a r e  described in this report. 
INTRODUCTION 
The objective of the NASA Apollo Program is to  land men on the lunar surface 
and to return them safely to earth.  The lunar-landing spacecraft must operate satis- 
factorily, with a crew of two astronauts, in space and on the lunar surface. Because 
extreme thermal conditions are encountered on such a mission, it was necessary to  as- 
certain whether the lunar module (LM) would perform adequately during the thermal 
extremes. 
ment and to verify the man/machine relationship and crew operating procedures, a s e -  
ries of tes t s  was conducted by the Space Environment Test Division (SETD) a t  the NASA 
Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC) in Houston, Texas. 
To confirm spacecraft performance in the thermal-vacuum (TV) environ- 
Each LM was  not tested in the TV environment, but design-verification t e s t s  
were conducted on a representative spacecraft which was manufactured and checked in 
the same manner as the flight spacecraft. To simulate the mission time lines, it was 
necessary to follow the planned flight time lines and to  establish a thermal similarity. 
The two crewmen were introduced when these prerequisites were met. The test crew- 
in much the same manner as was planned for  flight. After approximately 1 2  hours, the 
s men entered the spacecraft cabin under TV conditions and activated the vehicle systems 
- - _- . - 
=Whe Boeing Company, Houston, Texas. 
crewmen deenergized the vehicle and egressed the chamber while the spacecraft was 
maintained at TV conditions. 
t imes during various simulated mission conditions, 
This ingress/egress (I/E) was accomplished several  
A special test  vehicle, designated LM test article 8 (LTA-8), was  constructed by 
the spacecraft prime contractor. 
manned-flight LM, except that special safety items, supplemental instrumentation, and 
hardware required to simulate varying thermal loads were added. The tests were con- 
ducted in the MSC Space Environment Simulation Laboratory (SESL) chamber B. 
This vehicle was configured according to the f i r s t  
These tests satisfied the requirements f o r  the LTA-8 and were the f i r s t  tests of 
their  kind in the following three categories: 
1. First crew transfer f rom one se t  of umbilicals to another s e t  while a t  T V  
conditions 
2 .  First TV test of a complete, manned LM 
3. First tes t  at the MSC of a manned spacecraft in the TV environment, subse- 
quent to the revised NASA safety c r i te r ia  
The magnitude of the activities that a r e  described in this report  is demonstrated by the 
participation of more than 600 personnel of several  major MSC and contractor organi- 
zations. The purpose of this report  is to convey a discussion of the planning, prepara-  
tion, review, and specialized techniques which were required to meet the objectives of 
the TV test program. Pr imary  emphasis is placed on hardware, procedures, and 
training that affect crew safety. The tests are discussed only in t e rms  that a r e  r e l a -  
ted to manned activity and technical details of vehicle performance a r e  not included. 
A list of the acronyms used in this document is given in appendix A. 
FAC I L I TY DES C R I PT I ON 
Chamber B is a 35 -foot -diameter stainless steel  vessel  that has an overall height 
of 4 3  feet. The chamber can accommodate a vehicle that h a s  a maximum diameter of 
1 3  feet and a maximum length of 27 feet. Access to the chamber f o r  large test  a r t ic les  
is by a removable top head. Two rolling bridge cranes,  each of which has a capacity 
of 50 tons, are available to remove the chamber head and to inser t  test  art icles into 
the chamber. 
Chamber B supports a spacecraft  weight of 75 000 pounds on a fixed lunar-plane 
(chamber floor) 20 feet  in diameter. The lunar-plane temperature may be varied be- 
tween 100" and 400" K. 
nitrogen panels. 
The test  volume is shielded from the chamber walls by liquid- 
One double manlock is located at the lunar -plane level. Chamber penetrations 
for utility servicing of the spacecraft  a r e  located a t  the ground level. Instrumentation 
penetrations primarily are through the lunar plane. The chamber can be pumped 
2 
(while clean, dry, and empty) to a p res su re  of 5 :: t o r r  o r  less in 10 hours. The 
vacuum level that was achieved with the spacecraft in the chamber for  this test series 
was 1 x Further  details of the facility capabilities are given in 
references 1 to 3. 
t o r r  or less. 
L U N A R  MODULE TEST ARTICLE 8 D E S C R I P T I O N  
The LTA-8 was a production flight-configuration vehicle, but certain modifica - 
tions were made to accommodate the test. Hypergolic fluids were replaced with tri- 
chlorotrifluoroethane solvent, and spent squibs (pyrotechnic initiators) were used 
instead of live squibs. For  added safety during the initial manned tests, an additional 
television camera was placed in the cabin to monitor crew activities. Lights were 
added in the LTA-8 cabin to increase visibility during I/E activities. Water hoses for  
f i r e  suppression inside the cabin were connected to the facility water supply rather  
than to the flight-configuration water supply. Thus, an unlimited water supply was 
provided for emergencies. 
connected to the LM and the piping could be activated f rom outside the chamber. 
seats were added for crew comfort in the one-g environment. 
F o r  extended test operations, facility oxygen piping was 
Sling 
Basically, the subsystems were operable production units to support the specific 
requirements of the tests.  Instrumentation (in addition to the instrumentation used on 
flight spacecraft) was installed to determine the vehicle responses during TV testing. 
Because thermal inputs to LTA-8 were required to simulate solar  radiation and engine 
heat, heater ribbons were attached to the vehicle skin, the engine, and the heat shield 
in the vicinity of the engine. 
To decouple the LTA-8 thermally from the chamber, guard heaters  were in- 
stalled at all service lines between the vehicle and the chamber structure.  
details of the vehicle heaters  a r e  given in reference 4. 
Further 
THERMAL -VAC UUM I NGRES S lEGRES S 
To simulate the planned mission as much as possible, it was necessary to devise 
a method for spacecraft I/E while the chamber containing the spacecraft was main- 
tained at TV conditions. To conform to these conditions, ingress into chamber B was 
accomplished by the crewmen entering the manlock at ambient pressure,  after which 
the manlock and chamber p re s su re  were equalized in o rde r  for  the crewmen to enter 
the chamber. To reach the vehicle hatch for  entry into the spacecraft, the crewmen 
were required to climb a stairway which was 1 3 . 5  feet high and w a s  at an angle of 63" 
with the horizontal. A layout of the LTA-8 test  area is shown in figure 1. 
The simplest method for  accomplishing I/E would have been for  each crewman to 
have a self-contained environmental control system (ECS). 
portable life support system (PLSS), which was to be used later on lunar expeditions, 
proved to be too heavy in a one-g environment for the crewmen to maneuver for vehicle 
ingress.  In addition, the laboratory biomedical monitoring requirements exceeded the 
In trials on a mockup, the 
3 
f i  Spacecraft amber 
Figure 1. - Layout of tes t  area. 
PLSS telemetry transmission capabilities. 
Development of a special lightweight unit 
for chamber u s e  did not seem feasible 
within the t ime available. Therefore, it 
was determined that umbilicals would fur - 
nish life support and communications for  
these tes t s .  Three sets of umbilicals were 
used for  each test crewman. One set was 
used in the manlock; one set was used in the 
chamber; and one set was used in the space- 
craft  cabin. 
three umbilicals: gas supply, gas  return, 
and electrical. 
Each set was composed of 
To close the vehicle hatch upon in- 
g r e s s  and to close the manlock door upon 
egress ,  a unique problem was presented: 
how the crewmen could t ransfer  safely from 
one se t  of umbilicals to another s e t  at vac- 
uum conditions. A particular hazard con- 
sidered was that if a suit gas-connector 
check valve failed to close at umbilical dis-  
connect, the suit  would be dumped to vacuum 
conditions. This potential h a  z a r d was 
avoided by adding an in-line manual valve at 
each connection (fig. 2). Each suit was 
equipped with a supply connector and a 
return-gas umbilical connector on both the 
right and the left sides. 
Another potential hazard was that a crewman might fall while climbing to the top 
of the platform. 
each crewman. While standing on the ladder, each crewman was tethered to two cam- 
operated restraint  assemblies. Each restraint  assembly was attached to a rod on each 
side of the ladder. The crewmen were required to lift the handles of the restraint  as- 
semblies to slide the assemblies up o r  down the rods. Should a crewman lose his foot- 
ing or  become incapacitated while standing on the ladder, the toothed cam would engage 
the rod and prevent the crewman from falling beyond the length of the tethers. 
This hazard w a s  avoided by the addition of restraint  assemblies for 
Because both crewmen ingressed and egressed together, it was easier  for one 
The following is a summary of the ingress sequence of events. 
crewman to perform the actions necessary to transfer the umbilicals of the other crew- 
man, 
* 
1 .  The crewmen enter the manlock and are connected to the umbilicals while a t  * 
ambient pressure.  
2. The air in the manlock is evacuated and the manlock pressure is equalized 
with the chamber pressure.  
4 
I 
Suit oxygen I 
coniiector 
Suit 
-- 
Figure 2. - Ventilation umbilical 
connector system. 
3. The 
chamber. 
4. The 
umbilicals. 
5. The 
manlock door is opened to the 
crewmen transfer  to chamber 
crewmen attach the restraint  
assemblies and climb the ladder to the 
platform. 
6. The crewmen detach the restraint  
assemblies  and pull the slack in the umbil- 
icals up on the platform. 
7. The crewmen enter the spacecraft. 
8. The crewmen t r a n s f e r  to the 
spacecraft umbilicals. 
9. The crewmen stow the chamber 
umbilicals on the platform and close the 
cabin hatch. 
The t ime that w a s  required for the crew in- 
g r e s s  sequence, the ECS and manlock oper- 
ations, and the crew rest periods was 
1-1/2 to 2 hours. Egress  was performed 
in r eve r se  sequence and required approxi- 
mately half the t ime (because the manlock 
could be repressurized much fas te r  than it 
could be pumped down). 
THE MSC SAFETY MANUAL 
Minimum safety c r i te r ia  for manned ground testing either at  total oxygen pres-  
s u r e s  less  than 1 4 . 7  psia o r  at partial oxygen p res su res  greater  than 3 . 1  psia were 
incorporated into the MSC Safety Manual in May 1967. The chamber in which the LTA-8 
tes ts  were conducted conformed to a l l  requirements of the safety manual. 
quirements a r e  summarized in appendix B. 
4 These re- 
DETAILED TEST PROCEDURES 
All test  operations in the laboratory were conducted according to detailed step- 
by-step procedures. C r i t i  c a 1 system procedures were accomplished u n d e r 
5 
quality-control surveillance. Provisions were made to rev ise  the procedures if nec- 
essary .  The detailed step-by-step actions to be taken in the event of credible emer-  
gencies were preplanned, approved, verified, and practiced d u  r i n g  simulated 
emergencies. 
A specific document was prepared which contained test ru les  for  each se r i e s  of 
tests. The purpose of the test rules was to provide preplanned actions to be accom- 
plished in the event of off-normal conditions arising during the tests.  The order  of 
priority upon which the ru les  were based was (1) personnel safety and (2) prevention of 
damage to equipment. 
The test procedures were subjected to a comprehensive review and approval 
cycle as specified in the MSC Safety Manual. All tes t  procedures were distributed to 
test-team personnel at least 5 days before the test, unless specifically waived by MSC 
management . 
In addition to the normal supervisory review and approval cycle, investigative 
and review groups monitored the test  activities pr ior  to vehicle a r r iva l  at the MSC 
through post-test operations. These review groups a r e  described in appendix C. 
SAFETY SYSTEMS 
The chamber emergency repressurization (ER) system allowed chamber B to be 
pressurized with dry s tored gas  (approximately 22 percent oxygen and 78 percent ni- 
trogen) to 6 psia in 30 seconds. Then, the chamber could be repressurized to a 
14.7-psia environment in an additional 60 seconds (or longer, if desired) by using the 
dry stored gas  again. Ambient air was  not used because moisture would condense upon 
contact with the cold walls and would seriously impair visibility. 
activated manually either by the test director  or  the medical officer. If suit p ressure  
should drop to 2 ? 0.1 psia, the system would be activated automatically. 
The system could be 
A manually operated water fire- suppression system w a s  installed. The system 
consisted of four zones: the chamber test  volume, the portion of the chamber below 
the test  volume, manlock 1, and manlock 2. Each zone could be operated independ- 
ently. A diagram of the fire-suppression system is shown in figure 3. The system 
could deliver 450 gal/min on the spacecraft o r  30 gal/min in either manlock. The 
piping was heated and kept dry s o  that the w a t e r  would not f reeze if the f i r e -  
suppression system were activated. The plan was  to activate the system only at 6 psia  
o r  greater.  During TV tests,  the test  director w a s  responsible for  activation of the 
system. During ambient periods, the spacecraft contractor was  responsible for system 
activation. 
b 
An interlock system was installed to interlock the operation of safety-critical 
power sources  if an emergency occurred. The interlock is operated in one of three 
emergency modes: the f i r e  mode, the ER mode, o r  the power failure mode. The test  
director  activates the fire mode by operating the interlock s w i t c h  o r  the f i r e -  
suppression switch. Initiation of the ER system automatically activates the proper 
a 
6 
I 
Water spray sequences of the ER mode of the interlock 
system. The power-failure mode is acti- 
vated automatically by the loss  of pr ime 
laboratory power. 
bility of the interlock system. 
TabIe I shows the capa- 
Systeiit 1 
4 5 0  37 itozzles yal,'hiili total 
Systettt z 
detectors iiozzle
rJal/Itilittotal personnel safety. The system consists of an 
1 p d l  l l 0 X  
5 detectors 
In the event of facility power-supply 
failure, an emergency power system auto- 
matically s u p  p 1 i e s electrical  power to 
equipment and lighting that are essential fo r  
emergency power generator driven by a 
natural-gas engine which is equipped with a 
battery-powered starter and with an auto- 
Reiiiotely actuated 
soleiioid valves (typical) 
From Ibiiildiiir~ matic -load transfer device. During facility 
Systeliis 3 aiid 4 rtnatilocks) 'peration, the emergency power system 
1 p d l  b o x  each 
3 0  gal/lll ltl llladock 
runs unloaded at idling speed. Within 3 sec- 
Systetti 1 riser @ 1 2 detector t iozzles each  onds after power failure,  the emergency 
power system accelerates and picks up the 
emergency power load to which the system 
has been connected by an automatic transfer 
Manlocks switch. The emergency load consists of the 
medical officer console, the ECS, the cham- 
Figure 3. - Fire-suppression system. ber  and manlock lighting, and general a r e a  
\ 
water supply 
( 5  places) 
'. -.' 3 
4 
Power 
Vehicle skin heater 
power 
- 
Vehicle ground power 
- ~~ . 
Vehicle battery power 
- 
Vehicle supplemental in- 
strumentation stimuli 
power 
Airborne instrumentation 
ground power 
.- - 
Ground- support-equipment 
cabin-light power 
Facility ECS-to- 
spacecraft  valve power 
TABLE I. - INTERLOCK SYSTEM 
_. 
Mode and action taken by interlock 
Fire mode 
Deactivated 
Deactivated 
Deactivated 
Deactivated 
Deactivated 
Activated from emer-  
gency power 
Both crewmen are switchec 
to flow from facility EC: 
El3 mode 
Deactivated 
No actibn 
No action 
No action 
On emergency power; re- 
mains on 
Activated from emer-  
gency power 
Both crewmen a r e  switchec 
to flow from facility EC: 
Laboratory -power - 
failure mode 
Interlocks power off when 
facility power restored 
Interlocks power off when 
facility power restored 
Provides capability to re- 
move battery power man 
ually f rom outside the 
chamber 
No action 
On emergency power; re- 
mains on 
Activated from emergency 
power 
Both crewmen a r e  switche 
to flow f rom facility ECE 
7 
lighting. Frequency is regulated by a n  adjustable governor on the engine. The gover- 
nor maintains a frequency constant of 60 _+ 0.5 her tz  f o r  any constant load between one- 
fourth and full generator rating. 
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL SYSTEM 
Because the mission requirements necessitated hard-vacuum crew I/E, a facility 
ECS was installed to support the crewmen as they progressed f rom the manlock to the 
chamber and from the chamber to the spacecraft. Pr imari ly ,  the system consisted of 
three modules and a flow distribution panel. The overall requirements fo r  the ECS are 
summarized as follows. 
1. To provide 0 to 1.25 lb/min of oxygen to each suited crewman at suit  pres-  
s u r e s  of 3. 7 to 18.4 psia while a suit gas-inlet temperature of 50" 5 5' F is maintained 
) 
2. To provide oxygen flow-distribution control fo r  umbilical t ransfer  sequences 
3. To provide redundant life-support capabilities in the event of facility o r  
spacecraft ECS malfunctions 
4. To provide safety features  to prevent overpressure or  underpressure of the 
space suit during all normal and emergency operating modes 
5. To provide warm-gas flow to unused gas umbilicals while the umbilicals a r e  
exposed to TV conditions 
6. To provide a means for  pressurizing the suit to 18.4 ps ia  with air fo r  crew- 
training exercise s 
The manner by which these objectives were incorporated into the ECS design is 
discussed in the following sections. 
Environmental  Control  System Module 
Three identical open-loop ECS modules (one for each crewman, plus a backup 
unit) were fabricated and installed. 
in figures 4 and 5, respectively. 
module is supplied with 100 psig oxygen from the facility oxygen tube t ra i ler .  The 
oxygen is filtered to a 10-micron level and then is reduced to a 35-psig level at the 
suit-supply flowmeter. Suit p re s su re  can be maintained in one of the three  following 
ways. 
The ECS module and ECS schematics a r e  shown 
One ECS module is illustrated in figure 6. The ECS 
6, 
1. Differential p re s su re  control, 0 to 1 psia grea te r  than manlock, chamber, o r  
spacecraft p re s su re  
2.  Absolute pressure  control, 0 to 1 5  psia 
3. Manual control as desired, normally up to 18.4 psia 
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Key 
PI Pressure indicator 
T S  Temperature switch 
A P C  Absolute pressure controller 
DPC Differential pressure controller 
Instrument 
Pressure reference 
switch (3.4 psia) 
overpressure 
(0 to 16 scfm) 
vacuum through flow- 
distribution panel 
distribution panel solenoid valve 
Figure 4. - A schematic of the environmental control system module. 
The controllers are basically referenced to an equivalent suit pressure generated 
by adjusting two small  needle valves on the supply-and-return-line pressure taps so 
that the suit p re s su re  remains within ? 0. 04 psia of the controller settings under all 
normal operating conditions. 
were locked in position after the unmanned tes t s .  
These valves were calibrated during unmanned tes t s  and 
The oxygen (or  air for  crew training) travels through the flow-distribution system 
to and from the suit. Flow control is maintained by a globe valve on the return line, 
4 and the oxygen is discharged to the facility ECS vacuum-pumping system. 
I 
The ECS module includes the following additional components. 
1. The suit overpressure relief valve, set at 4. 5 psid 
2. The suit emergency oxygen supply, 0 .62  lb/min, which is initiated at a suit 
p re s su re  of 3 . 4  psia  
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1 - 1 / 2 - i n .  supply  
1 - 1 / 2 - i n .  supply  1 -1 /2 - i11 .  vacLiutn dump 
1-1/2-i11. vacuum dump 
1-1/2-i11. returr l  d i s t r i bu t i on  
11'2-iii. pressure reference 
F l o w  
panel 
breaker 1/2- i11.  pressure reference 
Hot or ch i l l ed  
water to  oxvqeii _J Datieis 
F l o w  paths 
as fo l l ows :  
- 
E C S  
3 
Retiiotely 
cot i t ro l led 
va'ves7 
Figure 5. - A schematic of the environmental control system. 
Figure 6. - The environmental control 
system module. 
- 
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MC ti iai i lock 
CH cliainber 
S C spacecraft > 
3. The vacuum-line solenoid valve, 
set to prevent the suit p re s su re  from be- 
coming less than 3.0 psia 
4. The vacuum dump relief valve, 
set to maintain 2. 5 psid downstream of the 
flow control valve (used only if the vacuum- 
pumping system failed) 
5. The suit-checkout relief valve, 
used to  exhaust air to the atmosphere dur- 
ing 18.4-psia suit-pressure mode (crew 
training) 
6. The oxygen manual pressure-  
control valve which provides a means of 
controlling suit p re s su re  in case of con- 
t ro l le r  open failure 
1 0  
7. The backup nitrogen supply for  the pressure controllers 
8. Electrical power f rom the facility emergency power bus 
All components of the ECS module are fail-safe; that is, the position of a component 
after a failure will not endanger the crewman. The seals and O-rings that were  used 
in the construction of each component were certified to be oxygen-compatible. 
liness of the modules was maintained to a high oxygen-compatibility level during 
fabrication. 
Clean- 
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Environmental Control System Qualification 
* 
The qualification of the open-loop ECS to support the LTA-8 program was  per- 
formed in three separate phases. Initially, a thorough shakedown was done and an in- 
formal test period was  held to identify and solve any operational problem encountered 
with the system prior  to start ing the formal qualification program. Nitrogen gas  was 
used in the system during this initial phase of testing. 
The formal oxygen-qualification program was based on a detailed tes t  procedure 
that exercised the ECS modules and flow-distribution system in all normal, emergency, 
and failure modes. Once the ECS had been qualified in an unmanned configuration, two 
manlock tests were done to verify both umbilical and backup-module transfer proce- 
dures and to demonstrate that the ECS w a s  man-rated. Because this test was manned, 
the safety and procedural considerations required for the LTA-8 tes t s  were also re -  
quired for the manlock tests. The manlock tes ts  were successful in verifying that the 
addition of a suited man to the system did not require operational changes from the 
unmanned configuration. 
Thermal Qualification 
After completion of the manlock tes ts ,  one major category of qualification w a s  
not verified until the start of spacecraft testing. This category w a s  the capability of 
the system to provide the required temperature control for  space- suit-inlet tempera- 
tu res  and to maintain the chamber umbilicals in a relatively warm condition. The um- 
bilical configuration is shown in figure 7. During the unmanned part  of the LTA-8 
man-rating test, a detailed tes t  of the ECS thermal capabilities was conducted. Vari-  
ous combinations of system p res su res  and inlet temperatures were se t  while gas-  
s t r eam and umbilical- surface temperatures were measured. The resul ts  of the tes t s  
are given as follows. 
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1. The effectiveness and control of gas-stream and umbilical-surface tempera- 
tu res  were more dependent on ECS total pressure and flow rate than on gas-inlet 
easily; but at 3.7 psia, the ECS operated at the low-temperature l imit  (50" F). 
b temperature. At an  operating p res su re  of 5 . 4  psia, temperature could be controlled 
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7 Electrical umbilical (BIOME0 and COMMI 
Insulation jacket 
(a) Two layers of Beta cloth (outer) 
Gas umbilicals (b) Seven alternate layers of H-film 
(1 -1 /4 - in .  inside diameler and open-weave Beta cloth 
(c )  One layer of Beta cloth (inner) silicone rubber) 
i
Figure 7. - The umbilical configuration. 
Figure 8. - The chamber umbilical- 
stowage panel with ECS 
interconnects. 
2. Heaters were required on the inter- 
connects on the chamber umbilical- stowage 
panel to prevent the interconnect tempera- 
ture from dropping to less than 30" F. This 
panel is shown in figure 8. 
3 .  Loss of flow to an i n s u l a t e d  
silicone-rubber umbilical resulted in a 
rapid temperature drop (40" to 50" F/hr), 
which emphasized the need for  maintaining 
warm-gas flow i n  the umbilicals at all 
times. 
e 
* 
4. The stainless steel  facility ECS 
oxygen lines to the spacecraft were much 
l e s s  sensitive to changes in pressure,  flow, 
and inlet temperature than were the insula- 
ted silicone-rubber umbilicals. 
The test of the ECS thermal capabilities was 
successful in verifying that the facility ECS 
was capable of maintaining the chamber and 
spacecraft oxygen lines within the desired 
operating range of 50" to 90" F. The test 
data also identified the required settings for  
pressure,  flow, the heat exchanger, and the 
stowage panel heater for each operational 
mode. These data were then used to define 
the procedural steps required to establish 
the proper ECS configurations. In general, 
gas-inlet temperatures (measured at the 
chamber penetration) were in the range of 
80" to 115" F so that a 50" F suit-inlet tem- 
perature was  achieved during chamber TV 
conditions. 
Envi ronmenta l  Contro l  System Operation 
The umbilical transfer sequences re-  
quired a high degree of coordination between 
tes t  crewmen and ECS operators because of 
the extensive valve sequencing required to 
ensure that the transfer w a s  made with 
little change in suit p re s su re  or  flow. De- 4. 
tailed procedures verified by several  I/E 
training runs were the means by which 
these sequences were perfected. During 
the manned tes ts ,  a l l  t ransfers  were made 
smoothly and safely. 
b 
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SPECIAL CREW-EQUI PMENT QUALIFICATION TESTS 
Vent i lat ion Umbil ical Connector System 
and ECS In te rconnec t  
The environmental control system interconnect (ECSIN) and the ventilation umbil- 
ical  connector system (VUCS) a r e  shown in figures 8 and 9, respectively. The follow- 
ing tests were conducted on a representative ECSIN and VUCS. 
1. Design-limit cycling, 1000 mission 
cycles, each at 4 psid 
2. Low temperature, cool down to 
30" F, followed by one mission cycle-and- 
leakage tes t  ( I O  scc/min maximum) 
3.  High temperature, heat to 220" F 
(for 30 minutes), followed by one mission 
cycle-and-leakage test (10 scc/min maxi- 
mum) 
4. Hard vacuum, 1 X t o r r  for 
2 hours, followed by a production accept- 
ance test  
5. Oxygen/humidity , 160" F oxygen, 
80 to 100 percent relative humidity at 
18.7, 14.7, and 5 psia (25 hours total) 
6 .  Pull test ,  200-pound pull, followed 
by leakage test  (10 scc/min maximum) 
Experience with the ventilation umbilical 
connector systems and the ECS intercon- 
nects showed that these items had been 
designed and qualified adequately fo r  the 
LTA-8 test  program. 
Figure 9. - A crewman wearing 
the VUCS. 
In one test ,  a failure of the chamber umbilical-stowage-panel heaters caused the 
ECSIN on the chamber umbilical-stowage panel to reach a low temperature of approx- 
imately -100" F during manned operating periods. The crewmen were able to egress  
with no difficulty, but extra force was required to connect the umbilicals to the ECSIN. 
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I ngresslEgress Stand 
The stairway and platform that were used to provide access  f rom the manlock 
door to the LTA-8 forward hatch a r e  shown in figures 1 and 10. The I/E stand consis- 
ted of a stairway, handrails, restraint  assemblies, a foldable slide assembly (for emer-  
gency egress), and the ingress  platform. Qualification tests of each subassembly were 
performed. 
Restraint assemblies. - The following 
qualification tes ts  of-the restraint  assem- 
blies were performed. 
1. Exposure of one restraint  assem-  
bly to a cold environment of -300" F and to 
the kinetic energy generated by 125 pounds 
falling a distance of 6 inches 
2. Exposure of one restraint  assem-  
bly to an  ambient- temperature environment 
and to the kinetic energy generated by 
125 pounds falling a distance of 6 inches 
3.  Exposure of all remaining r e -  
straint  assemblies t o  an ambient- 
temperature environment and to the kinetic 
energy generated by 125 pounds falling a 
distance of 6 inches with no visible damage 
to the cam teeth 
Success c r i te r ia  for  the tes ts  of the 
restraint  assembly were as follows. 
1. No more than one-fourth inch of 
travel of the restraint  assembly on the rail  
after the cam had been engaged 
Figure 10. - Two crewmen on 
the I/E stand. 
2. Self -engagement and holding (within one-fourth inch) of the restraint  assembly 
in a -300" F environment 
3.  F r e e  movement of the restraint  assembly with the cam disengaged 
The restraint  assembly held within one-sixteenth to one-eighth inch when subjected to 
the tests. 
Slide assembly. - The slide assembly was  tested to determine deployment capa- 
bility under the following conditions. 
1. Ambient temperature 
2. Cold temperatures  (-300 F) 
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3. Cold temperatures (-300" F) and ice resulting f rom the use of water spray in 
the chamber 
Four tes t s  incorporating force-measurement devices were made to deploy the slide f rom 
an enclosure in which the slide temperature could be controlled with liquid nitrogen. 
The slide was deployed successfully in all tests,  even when a thick coat of ice existed. 
Ingress platform and stairway. - A static loading tes t  was conducted in which the 
stairway was  loaded to 500 pounds (distributed over four steps) and the platform was  
loaded to 1000 pounds (distributed over four areas) .  At the satisfactory conclusion of 
the tests,  the I/E platform was installed in chamber B. 
System verification. - A 250-pound anthropomorphic dummy was  placed in a stand- 
ing position on the stairway and was  attached to the rest raint  assembly and handrails. 
The dummy was  dropped the maximum distance that a crewman might f a l l  if he lost  his 
footing and both handholds. The system performed as designed in that the dummy fell 
to the length of the te thers  and stopped. A crewman attached to the rest raint  assembly 
is shown in figure 11. The component par ts  of the rest raint  assembly are shown in 
figure 12. The deployed slide and a rescued subject in position to be lowered are shown 
in figure 13. 
Body 
Screw 
I rSpring 
Figure 11. - A crewman attached to 
the restraint  assembly. 
Figure 12 .  - The component par t s  of 
the rest raint  assembly. 
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Space Suits 
The space suits used by the test 
crewmen were of t h e  Apollo Block 11 
type A6L modified configuration, as shown 
in figures 9 and 11. Flight verification 
tes t s  were conducted in the MSC Crew Sys- 
tems Division tes t  facilities to qualify the 
suits for  altitude use. 
MEDICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The test-team members  whose ac-  
tions could directly affect the safety of 
the test  crewmen were required to take 
periodic medical examinations. All test 
crewmen and manlock observers  were 
examined by the medical officer pr ior  to 
each test .  
Figure 13.-  A rescued subject 
on the slide. 
A schedule of prebreathing of 
100 percent oxygen was followed by all 
tes t  crewmen and manlock observers  (ta- 
ble II). The prebreathing schedule w a s  
performed on an open-loop system and in parallel with other suit-room and manlock 
activities. 
TABLE 11. - PREBREATHING SCHEDULE 
Denitrogenation 
potential, f t  time, h r  
~- - 
4 8  500 
I 18 500 to 27 000 2 I 
More data were obtained during the ground tests than normally were obtained in 
During all phases of manned ground testing, the following data from within the flight. 
suit of the test crewmen were displayed on the medical-officer console. 
1. Oxygen partial p ressure  
2. Carbon dioxide partial p ressure  
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3.  Suit p re s su re  
4. Electrocardiogram (axillary and sternal) 
5 .  Respiration rate 
6. Body temperature 
In addition, three barostats were installed in the suit.  If any two of the three barostats 
should indicate a n  oxygen pressure of less than 2 . 1  psia, a signal would be sent to r e -  
pressurize the chamber automatically to 6 psia in 30 seconds using the ER system dis- 
cussed ear l ie r .  The insuit instrumentation vest is shown in figure 14. The electrical  
characterist ics of the instrumentation a r e  listed in table 111. 
Figure 14. - The insuit instrumen- 
tation vest. 
All signal and power wires  entering 
the suit were fused at 250 mill iamperes to 
minimize the potential hazards of electrical 
shock o r  fire in the space suits. The fuses 
were located outside the chamber and man- 
lock to reduce the bulk of the equipment used 
by the test  crewmen. 
Two -way voice communications were 
maintained at all t imes with the test crew- 
men and the manlock observers.  Although 
redundancies were incorporated into the 
pr ime and backup systems to increase reli- 
ability, a system of hand signals was devel- 
oped to allow a safe backout of the tes t  in 
case of voice -communications f a i 1 u r e .  
Television cameras  were mounted in strate- 
gic locations in the manlocks, the chamber, 
and the spacecraft to permit visual monitor- 
ing of test  crewmen and manlock observers.  
A heavy workload was imposed upon 
the test crewmen, particularly during as- 
cent of the stairway. When the hear t  rate 
became excessive, the medical officer di- 
rected the crewmen to rest until the rate  
decreased to a satisfactory level. 
A fully equipped emergency room was staffed during all manned tests.  A check- 
list was used to ensure that all the required equipment (such as cardiac defibrillators 
and resuscitators) was operating. 
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TABLE III. - INSUIT INSTRUMENTATION ELECTRICAL CHARACTERISTICS 
Sensor 
Oxygen partial 
pressure 
Carbon dioxide 
partial p re s -  
su re  
Suit pressure 
Baroswitches 
Two electrocardio- 
g rams  
graph 
Impedance pneumo - 
Body temperature 
Communications 
Other lines 
(power r e -  
tUX-IlS) 
Excitation 
voltage, V d c  
-6 
12 
-6 
12 
12 (400 Hz) 
20 
6 
10 
10 
-1 0 
10 
-1 0 
16.8 
Various 
Excitation 
current, mA 
12 
11 
12 
11 
50, peak to peak 
40 
1.66 
5 
7 
7 
5 
5 
40 
Various 
Signal 
voltage, V 
0 to 3 
0 to 5 
(a) 
(b) 
0 to 5 
0 to 5 
0 to 5 
2.2, peak 
to peak 
-- 
Signal nominal 
current, mA 
0 to 3 
0 to 3 
0.1 
0.6 
4 
4 
0 to 5 
200 
-- 
Fusing, mA 
250 
250 
250 
None 
250 
250 
250 
250 
250 
a~ to 100 mv.  
bSwitch closure. 
An operational hyperbaric chamber was available in a building near the labora- 
This hyperbaric chamber had the capability of exerting a 75-psig pressure and 
The chamber was staffed by trained personnel during all phases of manned 
tory. 
was to be used if a loss of p re s su re  caused a crewman to undergo decompression sick- 
ness. 
testing . 
EMERGENCY RESCUE 
M a n  lock-Observer Equipment 
Two manlock observers,  wearing nonflammable Beta cloth coveralls and protec - 
tive aviator helmets, were equipped with portable oxygen backpacks and radio-frequency 
communications. 
rescue situations and a bailout bottle for  use by the test crewmen. 
and the equipment used for  a rescue are shown in figure 15.  
Each observer carr ied a knife and a rope for  u se  during particular 
Manlock observers 
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Procedure Development 
L 
Figure 15. - The manlock observers  
and equipment. 
Eleven different rescue procedures 
were needed to accommodate the various 
combinations of crewmember locations dur - 
ing the test. These locations included the 
manlock, the stairway, the platform, the 
spacecraft cabin (standing), and the cabin 
sling seats (sitting). The cabin sling seats 
are used only in ground tests. The proce- 
dures  were developed by the use  of mockups 
of the spacecraft, the platform, and the 
stairway. In the course of procedure devel- 
opment, a foldover slide was added to the 
stairs, and stanchions were added to the 
platform so  that crewmen could be lowered 
down the slide. The slide rescue is shown 
in figure 13. 
Rescue Descr 
The basic rescue pr 
plified) a r e  as follows. 
pt ion 
)cedures (sim - 
1. The observer enters  chamber B 
at 6 psia. 
2.  The observer  disconnects the crewman suit w r i s t  ring to equalize the suit 
p r e  s su re  . 
3.  The observer  removes the crewman helmet. 
4. The observer  applies oxygen. 
5. The observer  moves the crewman to the manlock. 
6. The manlock operator repressur izes  the manlock to 14. 7 ps iaa t  the rate 
ordered by the medical officer. 
7. The medical officer en ters  the manlock to determine whether the crewmen 
should be carr ied to. the hyperbaric chamber, the emergency room, or the hospital. 
In the event of a fire,  the observers  would first remove the crewmen from the vicinity 
of the f i re  and then perform the appropriate procedures. 
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Each manlock observer received the following training. 
1. Thirty hours of classroom training 
2,  Sixty .hours of mockup training and timed dr i l ls  
3. Five hours of inchamber training and timed dr i l ls  
Classroom training included familiarization with the observer  equipment, the pressure  
garment assembly, the gas  and electrical umbilicals, and t h e  rescue procedures. 
Mockup training included rescue  demonstrations by the instructors,  walk-through res - 
cue practice by the trainees, and timed rescues f rom within the mockup cabin, using 
the complete observer equipment. The rescue subjects wore training p res su re  gar  - 
ments and umbilicals, as described previously. A performance critique followed each 
drill.  
iarization with the spacecraft hatch and cabin and timed rescues  from the platform and 
stairway. Rescued subjects were not removed from the actual spacecraf t  because of 
possible damage to the cabin and the hatch a rea .  The average t imes  for all rescue 
teams, with the observer starting in the manlock and the rescued subjects simulating 
unconsciousness in pressurized suits,  a r e  listed in table IV. 
onstrated that the orientation of the rescued subjects could affect  rescue t ime to the 
extent that approximately 2 minutes might elapse before oxygen could be applied di- 
rectly to the oronasal a r e a s  of both crewmen. 
crewmen would not be totally without oxygen for the 2-minute interval, but would be a t  
a total p ressure  of at least 6 psia (approximately 1. 3 -psia oxygen partial  p ressure)  in 
30 seconds following the initiation of the ER system. 
Chamber training, with the use of complete observer  equipment, included famil- 
These rescue dr i l ls  dem- 
However, i t  should be noted that the 
TABLE IV. - RESCUE TIMESa 
Rescue posture 
2 crewmen on cabin floor 
2 crewmen in cabin sea ts  
2 crewmen on platform 
1 crewman on stairway 
___ 
Time to administer oxygen 
to the crew, min:sec 
____ 
1 :36 
1 :37 
1:12 
1 :04 
Total t ime to the 
manlock, min:sec 
4:12 
4 :42 
b4:42 
3:18 
aThe t imes listed do not include an additional 30 seconds required for chamber 
bThis average time includes some rescue dr i l ls  with the heads of both rescue 
repressurization. 
subjects toward the ladder, If the feet of the rescue subjects were toward the ladder, 
the time required for the dril l  was approximately 1 minute less ,  
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TEST-TEAM CERT I FI CAT1 ON 
In addition to classroom and on-the-job training in the various specialty areas, 
all test-team personnel were  required to attend classroom training on the laboratory, 
on the test article, on high-altitude physiology, and on the hazards  of oxygen-enriched 
fires. Each organization participating in the test program was responsible for main- 
taining current  training records which were subject to audit. The records included the 
following entries. 
1. Duty-station description, function, responsibilties, and authority 
2. Duty-station requirements for educational background, classroom instruction, 
and on-the-job training 
Each organization submitted a list of names, grouped according to duty station, 
which certified acceptable training and performance of personnel. The personnel whose 
actions were likely to affect crew safety were certified both physically and mentally by 
the medical officer. All other personnel were certified similarly by their supervisors. 
Upon request, the medical officer ass is ted the supervisors  in evaluating personnel. 
The I/E procedures and crew-operated equipment were developed with the tes t  
Several I/E simulations were per-  
Each simulation identified additional modifications to hardware and proce- 
crewmen using training equipment on a mockup. 
formed. 
dures. While using the test  hardware in the final configuration, each of the test 
crewmen (pressurized above ambient conditions) performed the I/E procedures in the 
test  volume. Figures 10 and 11 illustrate I/E activity. 
With all test-team members  at the assigned duty stations, the tes ts  were simu- 
lated using the test  procedures,  and the team w a s  evaluated for proper performance. 
Credible emergencies were simulated and repeated until the response w a s  satisfac- 
tory. The final approved procedures were distributed to the test  team at least 24 hours 
pr ior  to the sta.rt of the simulations and at  least 48 hours pr ior  to the s t a r t  of aTVtes t .  
THE LTA-8 (LM-3) TEST PROGRAM 
The following manned tes ts  were conducted to satisfy the requirements of the 
LTA-8 test program. 
1. Facility ECS man-rating tes ts  
2.  LTA-8 man-rating test  
3 .  LTA-8 TV hot-case test, first manning 
4. LTA-8 TV hot-case test, second manning 
5.  LTA-8 cold-case test, first manning 
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6. LTA-8 TV cold-case test, second manning 
7.  LTA-g/PLSS tes t  
Facility ECS Man-Rating 
After the unmanned qualification of .the facility ECS, two manned tests were con- 
ducted in one of the chamber B manlocks. These tests involved final verification of the 
capability of the ECS and of the ECS distribution system to  perform all normal opera- 
tions safely in conjunction with pumpdown, repressurization, umbilical transfer,  and 
backup ECS module transfers.  In addition, these tests provided an opportunity to ver- 
ify the detailed valve- sequencing procedures that are involved in the umbilical transfer 
operations planned f o r  the actual hard-vacuum ingresses.  
in demonstrating the adequacy of the facility ECS, the biomedical/communications 
(BIOMED/COMM) system, and the operating procedures. 
The tes t s  were successful 
The LTA-8 Man-Rating Test 
A separate tes t  was conducted on the test  spacecraft to qualify the LTA-8 fo r  
manned use. 
served to  qualify the basic vehicle operation. 
6-psia environment. 
the use  of the umbilical t ransfer  sequences developed for  hard-vacuum ingress. 
lines were obtained fo r  each task. 
This manned tes t  followed two ear l ier  unmanned T V  simulations which 
Ingress to the LTA-8 was made in a 
The suit of the crewman w a s  pressurized to 3.7 psid oxygen by 
Time 
After the crewmen completed the ingress, a s e r i e s  of circuit-breaker and 
control-switch operations was conducted in the 6-psia-oxygen environment of the space- 
craft to demonstrate system control pr ior  to reaching vacuum conditions in the cham- 
ber .  Difficulty was encountered in verifying the 95-percent (minimum) oxygen 
concentration in the spacecraft until air leaks into the gas  sampling line were located 
and eliminated. 
Following the completion of the systems verification a t  6 psia oxygen, the vacuum 
Also, the tes t  involved use of the Apollo PLSS 
man-rating test was started. 
under 4. 8 -  and O-psia cabin conditions. 
in the LTA-8 cabin under vacuum conditions. 
tions with the PLSS resulted in termination of PLSS operations and in startup of the 
subsequent test sequence. It soon became evident that delays resulting from these 
difficulties had prolonged the test  to the point that the man-rating test  could not be com- 
pleted without subjecting both the tes t  crewmen and the test team to excessive fatigue. 
Accordingly, the tes t  was terminated, and the chamber was repressurized (using the 
dry stored gas mentioned ea r l i e r )  to a 6-psia environment. 
crew eg res s  was accomplished by the use of bailout bottles and oxygen masks .  
This test involved operation of most spacecraft systems 
Difficulty in establishing communica - 
An alternate method of 
The LTA-8 TV Tests 
The TV test series consisted of mission simulation of hot- and cold-case tests.  
t o r r )  were the same f o r  Chamber B conditions (-300" F shroud and less than 1 X 
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both tests. All spacecraft thermal simulations were performed by means of heaters 
on the spacecraft thermal skins and on the descent- and ascent-stage engines to s im- 
ulate the thermal effects of spacecraft maneuvers. 
To simulate the complete mission time line, two mannings of approximately 
Four ingresses and two egresses  were 12 hours each were required f o r  each test. 
made under TV conditions. 
eg res ses  of each test, were made in a 6-psia environment with a chamber free-air 
temperature of approximately 0"  F. 
of the crew at the manlock to the closing of the spacecraft hatch. 
The remaining two egresses,  which were the second 
The following are the ingress t imes f rom a r r iva l  
1. TV hot-case test, first manning, duration 3 hours, with a 1 -1/2-hour hold 
for biomedical instrument a t  ion troubles hooting 
2. TV hot-case test, second manning, duration 1 hour 33 minutes 
3.  TV cold-case test, first manning, duration 2 hours 10 minutes, with manlock 
pumpdown delay caused by gas load f rom ice on the manlock-door liquid nitrogen lines 
4. TV cold-case tes t ,  second manning, duration 1 hour 37 minutes 
Ingress t imes included transfer from portable oxygen ventilators to the facility ECS, 
BIOMED/COMM checks, suit checklists, pumpdown to manlock blankoff (50 to 100 mi-  
crons), and the actual umbilical transfer operations that were required to move from 
the manlock, up the s t a i r s ,  and into the spacecraft. All ingresses were conducted 
smoothly and without incident, primarily because of the extensive training that the 
crewmen received. 
The following are the eg res s  t imes from the opening of the spacecraft hatch to the 
exit of the crewman from the manlock. 
1. TV hot-case tes t ,  first manning, duration 58 minutes (hard-vacuum egress)  
2 .  TV hot-case tes t ,  second manning, duration 49 minutes (6-psia eg res s )  
3 .  TV cold-case test ,  f i r s t  manning, duration 62 minutes (hard-vacuum egress)  
4. TV cold-case tes t ,  second manning, duration 48 minutes (6-psia egress)  
Egres s  took l e s s  time than ingress.  The i.easons for this include the relative 
ease of descending compared with ascending the stairway, the shorter  manlock- 
repressurization time compared with pumpdown time, and the lack of extra  activities 
such as suit-integrity checks. 
Although appearing to take l e s s  time, the 6-psia eg res ses  actually took more 
t ime if the t ime required to  repressurize  the chamber to 6 psia and to warm the air 
temperature to  0" F was considered. This process  took approximately 2 hours, during 
which t ime the crewmen accomplished the shutdown of the spacecraft and waited fo r  the 
proper chamber conditions to  be achieved. 
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The LTA-81PLSS Test 
A s  previously mentioned, one of the objectives of the LTA-8 test program was to 
operate the PLSS in a depressurized LM environment to validate the t ransfer  sequences 
from the LM ECS to the PLSS and back to the LM ECS. Because of problems with the 
LTA-8 communications relay and the accidental discharge of the PLSS battery, attempts 
to accomplish this objective during the man-rating and T V  t e s t s  were unsuccessful. 
Because this validation was considered to be a mandatory t e s t  objective, a separate  
pumpdown (vacuum only) of chamber B was made. 
atmospheric p re s su re  with the use  of portable oxygen ventilators. 
perfectly, and all test  objectives were accomplished. 
The crew ingressed and egressed at 
The PLSS operated 
The LTA-8 (LM-5) Tests 
After modification of LTA-8 to a later configuration, two more  se r i e s  of TV tests 
were performed. 
craft  response to a wide range of lunar-mission thermal  loads was evaluated. 
During five manned periods totaling more than 64 hours, the space- 
CONCLUD I NG REMARKS 
The successful manned operations of the tes ts  bear  evidence that the planning, 
preparation, reviews, and specialized techniques developed were sound. The problems 
that arose were solved without compromising safety o r  unduly delaying the test program. 
Although this major test  s e r i e s  in the development of the Apollo lunar module involved 
many complex and potentially hazardous test  techniques, the combined efforts of the 
test  crewmen and the NASA and contractor engineers and technicians were successful 
in the completion of this essential manned test  program. 
Manned Spacecraft Center 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Houston, Texas, November 26, 1969 
914-50-20-19 -72 
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ACRONYMS 
APC 
BIOMED/COMM 
CH 
DPC 
ECS 
ECSIN 
ER 
I/E 
LM 
LTA-8 
ML 
MSC 
MTOB 
OR1 
PI 
PLSS 
PS 
sc 
SESL 
SETD 
TRRB 
TS 
absolute p r e s  s u r  e controller 
biomedicalj’communications 
chamber 
differential p ressure  controller 
environmental control system 
environmental control system interconnect 
emergency repressurization 
ingr ess/egr e s s  
lunar module 
LM test  art icle 8 
manlock 
Manned Spacecraft Center 
Manned Test  Operations Board 
operational readiness inspection 
p res su re  indicator 
portable life support system 
p res su re  switch 
spacecraft 
Space Environment Simulation Laboratory 
Space Environment Test  Division 
Test  Readiness Review Board 
temperature  switch 
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T V  
vucs 
thermal  vacuum 
ventilation umbilical connector system 
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APPENDIX B 
SAFETY REQU I REMENTS FOR MANNED GROUND TEST1 NG 
The following a r e  safety requirements for conducting manned ground testing. 
1. Hardware design must include fail-safe features,  backup systems,  and ade- 
quate controls to minimize the possibility of injury to personnel. 
2. Certification of test-team personnel must  include demonstration of a thorough 
knowledge of duty -station operations, training in high-altitude physiology, and familiar - 
ization with the hazards of oxygen-enriched f i r e s .  Tes t  personnel a l so  must be certi-  
fied as physically and mentally qualified. 
3.  A safety group, separate  f rom the test organization, must review and ap-  
prove the test  activities. 
4. Standard procedures for configuration control, calibration, technical review, 
and readiness approval for  testing must be used. 
5. A quality-control group, separate  f rom the test  organization, must use  well-  
defined procedures to a s su re  compliance with documented requirements.  
6. System analysis to include failure modes and cleanliness requirements of all 
test hardware must be performed. 
7. Test  personnel shall not be subjected to a test  environment in which a credi- 
ble single-point failure will result  in injury. 
8. Medical surveillance of test  subjects is required, as is the provision of ap-  
propriate emergency treatment equipment, including hyperbaric facilities. The s u r  - 
veillance includes the authority to terminate the test. 
9. 
be kept to the minimum, and the use of flammables must be analyzed carefully for safety 
considerations. 
A rigid material-control plan must be established, hazardous material must 
10. Test  checkout operations must include personnel briefings, ambient dry runs, 
simulated emergencies, and an unmanned environmental tes t  to exercise  personnel and 
equipments pr ior  to manned tests.  
11. Detailed test  procedures approved by medical, quality, safety, and other per  - 
sonnel must be developed for normal and emergency operations. 
28 
APPEND I X C 
SAFETY REVIEW GROUPS 
Operational Readiness I nspection 
Senior technical experts  f rom outside the test organization ascertained and cer -  
tified the operational readiness of the laboratory. Consideration w a s  given to the 
adequacy of design, training, documentation, quality control, configuration control, 
failure-effects analysis, support services,  spares, and safety provisions. All t asks  
recommended by the operational readiness inspection (ON) committee were resolved 
satisfactorily. 
The MSC Manned Test Operation Office 
In accordance with the MSC Safety Manual, tes t  safety officers participated in all 
phases  of manned test activities. 
operations of the test facility and the test  article. The officers reviewed and approved 
t e s t  plans and procedures and had the authority to order  discontinuance of any test  op- 
erat ions deemed to be unsafe. 
The t e s t  safety officers were  knowledgeable in the 
I ndus t r ia l  Safety at t h e  MSC 
The normal hazards  expected around a large industrial complex, such as cryo- 
genic handling, flammable storage a reas ,  and high-pressure fluids, were kept under 
surveillance by the MSC industrial safety group. 
entire laboratory complex to ensure that safe practices were maintained. 
Periodic inspections were made of the 
Contractor Safety Groups 
Both the vehicle contractor and the laboratory operating contractor established 
safety groups whose activities were coordinated by NASA, 
tory practices, plans, procedures,  equipment, and so  forth to assure  safe operations. 
Under NASA direction, each contractor organized fire -control and rescue teams and 
held periodic unscheduled emergency dril ls  to ensure team proficiency. 
Each group reviewed labora- 
Laboratory Safety Groups 
At the MSC, all supervisors  a r e  responsible for  safety. In the SETD, one person 
was assigned the responsibility for  coordination of industrial safety, f i r e  dril ls ,  and 
hazardous work permits. All aspects  of manned testing in the laboratory were reviewed 
by the Manned Test  Operations Board (MTOB). The board consisted of representatives 
f rom the SETD, environmental medicine, test crew, crew equipment, quality, and 
safety NASA organizational elements and laboratory and spacecraft contractors. The 
board investigated such i tems  as hardware, normal and emergency procedures, 
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training, systems integration, and conformance with the MSC Safety Manual require  - 
ments listed previously. 
Test Read i ness Review Board 
Within t h e  week pr ior  t o  performing the s e r i e s  of TV tests, a test  readiness 
review was conducted. 
crew equipment, and the ground -support equipment, the data-acquisition system, and 
the test  facility readiness to achieve the tes t  objectives safely. The Test  Readiness 
Review Board (TRRB) was composed of senior officials of the MSC organizations in- 
volved in the test. 
The purpose of the review was to evaluate the spacecraft, the 
The TRRB reviewed work accomplished after the OR1 discussed previously, and 
reviewed the status of discrepancies and open work. 
the qualification/certification status, reviewed material deviations, and specified the 
actions necessary pr ior  to testing. Only after final approval by the TRRB could the 
t e sting begin . 
In addition, the TRRB determined 
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